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If immigration causes a decrease in social cohesion, then it may also be an important
contributing factor in the recent failure of financial institutions. The present analysis
finds some evidence for a negative relationship between immigration and
volunteering from the Current Population Survey 2004–2008 September
Supplements. Various specifications confirm the tendency of immigrant inflows to
decrease social cohesion, as measured by the tendency of native U.S. citizens to
volunteer. Differences in effect by type of volunteering organization, country of
origin of immigrants, functional form, and voting as the relevant measure of social
cohesion are explored with similar patterns of results. Differences in effect by city
size provide a counterpoint, lending support to the alternative idea that immigration
does not in fact decrease social cohesion.
JEL codes: H8; Z13; J61
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Social cohesion, the commitment on the part of members of a group towards per-
ceived common goals, is clearly a prerequisite for the flourishing of that group. Cohe-
sion is promoted by feelings of group unity and pride, while the erosion of social
cohesion has been considered as a possible contributing factor in our current world-
wide bleak economic state. A decrease in social cohesion leads to weaker civic parti-
cipation, as well as reduced public good provision, and it may also lead to the
disruption of financial institutions through weakened property rights, reduced
micro-credit lending, higher rates of default and decreased viability of small firms.
Groups that are difficult to join, contain similar members, promote a shared sense of
community, and highlight differences with “out-group” individuals usually possess
greater social cohesion. Conversely, Putnam (2007) theorized that the disruption of so-
cial cohesion has been heightened by immigration. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to
test the veracity of this claim in a causal sense using large, recent, representative and
disaggregated data. Scholars subsequent to Putnam’s 2007 study have found inconsis-
tent results for the United States—the focus of most of this research—as opposed to
results in Europe. Data from European countries (as opposed to the United States)
show that the relationship between social cohesion and measures of diversity and im-
migration are generally mitigated when including measures of income inequality
(Becares 2011; Demireva 2011; Gesthuizen et al 2009). This result has arisen in a num-
ber of European studies, including, for example, studies of the UK using Census and
Citizenship Survey data (Becares 2011), and studies of twenty-eight separate European
countries in Gesthuizen et al. (2009).2014 Neymotin; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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ethnic/country of origin groups and type of volunteering has also rarely been
attempted, although the inclusion of all of these elements would lead to a much
clearer picture of how immigration is truly affecting social cohesion in the United
States. More specifically, determining the spillover from immigrants to natives would
help disentangle the effect of immigrants on lowering social cohesion simply by a
local average effect from immigrant interaction with natives and, in the language of
Alesina, an “aversion to heterogeneity” effect. It is for this reason that the present
analysis focuses on the effect of immigration on United States natives, and further
stratifies by elements such as race and type of social cohesion measured.
By using Current Population Survey September Supplement Volunteering data from
2004–2008 (just before and during the onset of the current recession), and controlling
for immigrant location selection and income inequality, the present work represents
a novel addition to the literature. The data is large, representative, recent and dis-
aggregated. The structure I use makes a causal interpretation of immigration (the
1990–2000 cohort) as affecting the volunteering participation of native-born
United States citizens more plausible than in other related studies. I use county-
linked Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) level area characteristics, as well as a
measure of volunteering fifteen years prior, the average volunteering in the 1989
Current Population Survey, to account for immigrant location selection.
In robustness checks, I also employ a linear probability model to account for noise in
my choice of instrumental variable with these additional results generally confirming
those in the main analysis. Distinctions in results between the full sample of cities
versus large, densely populated cities, I argue, explain differences in results more
generally between the United States and Europe in analyses of volunteering, with
the caveat that these differences may also show evidence for a limited effect of
immigration on volunteering.
I find that large, densely populated cities in the United States look quite similar to
cities in Europe in having little relationship between volunteering and immigration
after accounting for income inequality. It turns out that the anomalous nature of
the immigration-to-social-cohesion relationship in the United States as a whole is
driven by the smaller and more sparsely populated cities in the United States. After
all, Manhattan, Kansas is in a much less favorable position to deal with new im-
migrants than is Manhattan Beach, California or Manhattan, New York. Therefore, it
is true that the full sample, which uses both large and small cities, does verify that
native United States citizens are more likely to “bowl alone” when there are higher
rates of immigration, and the question is whether this is a causal effect. The
strength of the conclusions to be drawn is circumscribed, however, if it is the case
that selection by natives is conditional on personality characteristics such as egocen-
tricity. Accordingly, the ability of the present analysis to distinguish between these
two hypotheses is limited.
In the final of the auxiliary analyses, I explore the effect of using voting, rather than volun-
teering, as the measure of social cohesion. While voting is a less commonly employed meas-
ure of social cohesion in this literature, and it is probably useful to consider voting at still
smaller levels of aggregation - such as local area levels - these initial results are used as
robustness checks for the negative relationship I generally find between social
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voting using more specific data at the local and tract level, which may be a better
level of aggregation in the case of voting, in order to examine in more detail the
mediating effect of city size.
Finally, in placing this work within the context of the existing literature, perhaps the
most similar analyses to the present one are Costa and Kahn (2003) study using 1974
and 1989 data. They use less relevant, older data and, furthermore, do not account for
selection or immigrant flows as I attempt to do here. Also, Alesina et al. (1999) found a
negative effect of diversity but examined a slightly different outcome: whether individ-
uals in communities with varying amounts of heterogeneity were more or less likely to
vote to increase local taxes. They also used the smaller GSS rather than CPS data and
did not find varying effects based on city size—in contrast to my results where city size
does appear to matter. Finally, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) looked at the outcome of
“trust” rather than activities and volunteering, and used a fractionalization rather than
a concentration approach as I do here - with some evidence that concentration mea-
sures provide a more straightforward analysis. In this last case, results in Alesina and
La Ferrara’s work show similar patterns to those in my analysis, although they use the
smaller, and hence noisier, GSS data. Taken together, the present analysis presents a
helpful and necessary addition to the growing literature in the area.
I. Background and motivation
A. Economic and community declineFrom a business perspective, with lower levels of social cohesion there is less trust
and lending, as well as higher default rates among microfinance cooperatives (Costa
and Kahn 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Putnam 2007), since individuals do
not feel bound to maintain face before their friends and neighbors by not
defaulting. There are also problems in innovation and coordination leading to
successful competition in the international market by small vs. large firms. This has
been pronounced in the case of Italy and several other European countries
(Ramazzotti 2010). At a continental level, the seminal work by Easterly and Levine
(1997) has shown that heterogeneity leading to decreased social cohesion in Africa
is associated with more clans, more crime, more black markets, and much lower
levels of country-wide growth than otherwise similar countries in the continent
with lower levels of heterogeneity and higher social cohesion. These effects are
understandably affected by levels of political stability and democratic rights.
Other work, however, has found little effect of crime in mitigating the social
cohesion-diversity relationship. This is true although Putnam (2007) initially posited
a very strong effect in this area (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Mohan et al. 2011).
At the community level, there is less fundraising in schools, lower rates of
participation in social reform projects, fewer people volunteering or giving to
charity, less contribution to schools, fewer friends, lower levels of happiness and
more television watching (Putnam 2007; Poterba 1997). In a sense, one possibility is
that with lower levels of social cohesion and more heterogeneous communities,
there is simply more difficulty in sharing resources in ways individuals deem to be
equitable (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). While a lack of social cohesion owing to
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tronage”, as in publicly provided private goods - (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005),
there will be lower levels of provision of the public good and other ills just de-
scribed, making it unclear which is really the best strategy to employ.
B. Measuring social cohesion
Social cohesion is generally conceived of as either social capital maintenance or else
methods of creating solidarity and equality of access. While there are other
conceptions and definitions of this term, these two appear to be the most
commonly used in the literature and closest to their initial intent—especially in the
burgeoning economics literature. Measures of social cohesion have included, as a
few examples: membership in networks, social solidarities, membership in clubs/
associations/volunteer work, social trust, social order, common values, civic
participation, and place attachment (Galabuzi and Teelucksingh 2010; Demireva
2011; Vigdor 2004). It is for this reason that the present analysis focuses on
volunteering in clubs (the most frequently employed measure, aside from “general
social trust”) as well as employing measures of voting in one of the auxiliary
analyses.
While social cohesion has been extensively discussed, there is no commonly agreed
upon method for choosing the outcome (or outcomes, if multi-faceted and, per-
haps, a “better” measure) representing social cohesion. It does appear that stated
levels of trust or club participation (such as volunteering) have received the most
support as measures of social capital maintenance. An additional reason for using
club associations are their high documented correlation with social trust (Glaeser
et al. 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002) —although the direction of causality is un-
clear. Hence, the focus of the current work on volunteering behaviors.
The use of clubs and associations/volunteer memberships runs afoul of the
possibility that these groups maintain the embedded class structure and reflect
individuals that have access to resources. Scholars have begun to reconsider and
give less credence to this idea, since membership in voluntary associations and
religious groups has indeed become much more heterogeneous—exhibiting both
“bridging” (relations to out-groups) as well as “bonding” (relations to the in-group)
types of social capital. For the reasons mentioned above, voting is used to generally
confirm and extend the main results of the present analysis.
C. Immigration and social cohesion
After seeing the societal ills an erosion of social cohesion can cause-either in the
real world, theoretically, or in experimental games (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005) -
and after understanding what social cohesion actually means, it is apparent that
when Putnam (2007) demonstrated that immigration (as a form of increasing ethnic
and linguistic heterogeneity) in Italy eroded social cohesion, he caused quite a com-
motion. If, in fact, immigration causes a significant decline in social cohesion lead-
ing to economic decline, countries need to reevaluate their immigration policies.
Although immigration and diversity in general has many, possibly longer-term, ben-
efits, not the least of which are an increased opportunity for innovation by immi-
grant entrepreneurs and scientists, a richer culture, long-run growth,
positive (or at least neutral) effects on native student achievement, and the benefits
of “portfolio diversity insuring against risk” (Costa and Kahn 2003; Putnam 2007;
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it would then be very possible that it is these same effects which are responsible for
our current economic decline.
For this reason, among others, a literature has recently developed to test the veracity
of Putnam’s claims and, more generally, the strength of the relationship between
immigration/diversity and social cohesion worldwide. For the most part, evidence in
the aforementioned and other studies showing that immigration and heterogeneity
decrease social cohesion at the country level has been shown to be overstated, since
accounting for income inequality decreases the strength of the stated relationship
(Green et al. 2011; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Demireva 2011; Letki 2008;
Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). After including measures of inequality—whether Gini
coefficients, the fraction of individuals below the poverty line, the 90/10 ratio, or the
average to median income in communities or countries—the effect of immigration on
social cohesion declines in magnitude and significance. This is especially true for
European studies, with U.S. studies breaking with the general trend by generally
maintaining a clear and significant effect of immigration in decreasing social cohesion
(Becares 2011; Galabuzi and Teelucksingh 2010; Hooghe et al. 2009).
Nevertheless, some of the problems with which very few of these studies have been
able to contend (whether Putnam’s original study) or later work, have been
(1) difficulty controlling for selection based on preferences for local good provision,
(2) issues with the small size or highly-aggregated nature of the data, and
(3) difficulty finding credible measures of inequality and fractionalization. As Simpson
(2006) notes, fractionalization may actually not be measuring what we want it to, so
that the current reliance on the fractionalization index which is actually quite crude as
a measure may be faulty. The present analysis is an attempt to address these issues.
Immigrants, generally a lower income group, will, on average, increase the number
of people with “low levels of access,” thus, the relationship is almost definitional.
However, the use of income inequality may be more than a truism, since Putnam’s
definition of social cohesion falls closer to the idea of “social capital” and its
maintenance. Unfortunately, many of the measures of both social capital and social
cohesion as inequality reduction are very similar—making it difficult for researchers
to decide exactly which ones to employ.
Work by Alesina and La Ferrara provides a good framework and reasons why
immigrants should have lower levels of social trust and cohesion. Specifically, it
could be said that immigrants exhibit many, if not all, of the characteristics of
individuals likely to have reduced levels of social capital, and hence low social
cohesion as measured by social capital maintenance. Immigrants are often in the
lower income tiers, and may additionally suffer from discrimination—by language if
not always by ethnicity, although generally the wave of Hispanic and Asian
immigrants represents a minority to the United States. Also, immigrants have lived
in the area for a shorter period of time with fewer ties to the location—although
some would argue that, although individual immigrants have weaker ties to other
individuals, their communal ties tend to be stronger than those for natives—see for
example Gorney and Torunczyk-Ruiz (2011). Lastly, immigrants tend to locate in
areas of higher income inequality (selection) making them less likely to have high
social capital.
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The main data employed for this analysis were the 2004–2008 Current Population
Survey (CPS) September Volunteering Supplements. The 1989 CPS September Volunteer-
ing Supplement was also used to establish baseline average volunteering rates by CBSA and,
therefore, represents a correction for immigrant location selection.
Earlier historic measures of volunteering in the community were used as an immi-
grant location selection correction due to concerns that current waves of immigrants
select their location of choice conditional on economic conditions in the area. Because
it is also true that immigrants tend to settle in historically high immigration areas, and
historical measures of immigration should not generally correlate with current eco-
nomic shocks, this measure is used to correct for the type of selection which may hin-
der the ability to determine the effect of immigration independent of local area
characteristics. This selection correction is standard in the immigration literature
(Dustmann et al. 2005; Card 2001; Bartel 1989). The historic measure has often been
20–30 years prior which is essentially the time difference for, at least the later, portion
of data used here.
The CBSA level was chosen because it was the level typically employed by the Census
during this wave, and was meant to replace and merge both Micropolitan and Metro-
politan Statistical Areas. This more comprehensive measure is useful in later generaliz-
ing results, particularly for city size stratifications.
The September Supplements include a series of questions regarding (formal) volun-
teering activities and choices. As a caveat, employing formal, rather than informal
volunteering, will, if anything, understate the relationship between volunteering and
immigration due to the lower correlation between formal volunteering and social cohe-
sion (Tong 2010; Letki 2008), so that measured relationships between volunteering and
immigration may actually be even stronger than found in the current analysis.
The CPS, as opposed to the General Social Survey (GSS), which is typically used in
these types of analyses, or other time diary data such as the American Time Use Survey
(ATUS), was chosen due to its very large and representative nature and the particular
breakdowns given to both immigrant status and type of volunteering. Auxiliary analyses
on voting employed a similar structure and used the 2004, 2006 and 2008 CPS November
Supplements. In the case of voting, the 1990 CPS November Supplement was used
to establish baseline average volunteering rates by CBSA as the immigrant location
selection correction.
Voting data employed from the CPS included a binary indicator for whether an indi-
vidual had voted in the previous election. Volunteering information employed from the
CPS data included a binary indicator for whether an individual volunteered their time,
as well as indicators for whether the individual volunteered for several representative
choices of organizations including (1) immigrant focused, (2) religious, (3) child-
focused, (4) civic, (5) social service, and (6) international1.
Notice that volunteering for a child’s education has many fewer immigrant volunteers
since immigrant parents tend to have less information and perhaps self-concept regard-
ing the ability to contribute. This concept of information as hindering the volunteering
of immigrants is explored further in several sources (for example, see Gele and Harslof
2012; Handy and Greenspan 2009). Religious volunteering is also differentiated from
the group, since immigrants tend to first be tied to religious organizations. It is posited
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communities (Galabuzi and Teelucksingh 2010). Empirical results have not, however,
found a strong effect of religion.
Individuals in the CPS who were foreign born (either non-citizens or naturalized citi-
zens) were considered members of the first generation, while individuals born in the
United States to either two foreign born parents or to one foreign and one native-U.S.
parent were considered members of the second or 2.5 generation, respectively. Other
individuals born in the United States—or abroad to U.S. parents as in Card et al. (2000)—
were considered members of the third (or higher) generation. For all immigrant
stratifications, it was not possible to condition on legal status, since this information
was not available in the 2000 Census or CPS data, although the Census did make efforts
during this period to interview individuals of illegal immigrant status.
Individual ethnicity and country of origin was also used to account for immigration
of one’s racial/ethnic or country of origin type. In particular, Mexico, one of the largest
countries of origin during this time period, is controlled for in a separate fashion. In
contrast, due to data concerns, many other country-of-origin groups are limited to the
continental or sub-continental level.
Additional individual-level characteristics employed from the Current Population
Survey as control variables included age, sex, education, family income, race, the pres-
ence and ages of children, the number of individuals in the household and employment
status. Notice that employment status was chosen rather than hours of work due to the
more endogenous relationship between hours and volunteering. The analysis was re-
stricted to individuals answering that they were of a single, rather than multiple, racial
backgrounds.
In addition to Current Population Survey data, Census 2000 Summary files (3 and 4)
were used to determine aggregate information in the area regarding immigration and
local area characteristics. Data were matched from the Census Summary Files to the
CPS using a CBSA-MSA match through counties. New England County Tabulation
Areas (NECTA’s) were dropped due to the coding structure.
The foreign-born individuals of interest from the Census data were the 1990–2000
cohort of immigrants. Country of birth of the immigrants, as well as race/ethnicity,
employed the same categories as the CPS. Census information was also employed to
create several alternate measures of inequality in the area, including the ratio of average
to median family income, the fraction of the total population below the poverty line
and the fraction of immigrants below the poverty line. Additional local area characteris-
tics employed in the analysis included total population size and density, average age,
employment rate, fraction of various racial groups, average education and median fam-
ily income.III. Calculation
The goal of the empirical analysis is to determine whether an inflow of immigrants af-
fects the likelihood that natives will contribute to public goods and volunteer their
time. In order to control for possible location selection of immigrants, average 1989
volunteering at the CBSA level is employed, and immigration is measured as the frac-
tion of foreign born from the 1990–2000 cohort relative to the total population in the
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rectly picking up the tendency of immigrants to locate in areas with historically low
levels of immigration—through the 1989 average volunteering control—and, therefore,
create bias in the effect of immigration on the individual likelihood of volunteering. It
is also true that native selection will be mitigated, since measures are taken at the
CBSA-linked to county level, which should be a high-enough level of aggregation that
there will be minimal sorting of natives at this level. Technically, the literature agrees
on the county level for native sorting, and some work uses the MSA level. See for ex-
ample Vigdor (2004).
Clearly, immigrants may prefer sorting by area even at this higher level of aggrega-
tion. For this reason, employing the previously mentioned average volunteering in 1989
will also be necessary to account for selection2.
This strategy will, therefore, show the effect of the 1990–2000 immigration on indi-
vidual volunteering rates of natives in 2004–2008 after accounting for immigrant loca-
tion selection bias conditional on average volunteering rates in the area. Prior research,
particularly using European data, has also shown that measured impacts of immigration
diminish after controlling for income inequality in the local area. For this reason, sev-
eral measures of income inequality are alternatively employed to account for this possi-
bility. Controls at the individual and the local area level are also progressively added in
to the regression structure.
The main portion of the analysis employs a probit structure with marginal effects
and clustering at the CBSA level to use the most conservative standard errors possible.
Probability weights for sample inclusion are also employed. Specifically, for individual i
in local area j:
Pr Volunteeri;j ¼ 1jDemogi;CommCharj; Frac Immigj; Inequalityj
 
¼ Φ β0Demogi þ β1CommCharj þ β2Frac Immigj þ β3Inequalityj
 
Where Φ (.) represents the cumulative normal distribution function.
Volunteer is either an indicator for whether an individual volunteers generally or, in
the appendix section, for a specified volunteer organization. In many cases, individuals
volunteered for multiple different types of organizations. Demog represents demo-
graphic characteristics of the individual (age, age2, sex, education, family income, race,
the presence of children, number of individuals in the household, and employment sta-
tus). Since “natives” include any individuals from the 2nd, 2.5 or 3rd (or later) gener-
ation, Demog also includes binary indicators for the generational status of the native in
question—as well as whether the foreign parent is the mother or father in the case of
the 2.5 generation. Additional robustness checks vary this structure and separately
examine the effect of immigration on the volunteering choices of the subset of 3rd (or
later) generation or, alternatively, 2nd generation natives. CommChar include commu-
nity area average characteristics (total population, population density, average age, em-
ployment rate, fraction representation of various racial groups, education and median
family income)3.
Inequality represents either (a) the fraction of individuals in the total population
below the poverty line, (b) the fraction of immigrants below the poverty line or (c) the
ratio of average to median family income in the area. Notice that measures of income
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income (fraction below poverty), (2) it may be that immigrants have an indirect effect
via their levels of poverty (fraction immigrants below poverty) see Gustavsson and
Jordahl (2006), or else (3) distribution and skewness made the key difference as in
Alesina et al. (1999). All three measures were employed in order to contrast these differing
theories for why income inequality may affect social cohesion and generally determine
whether statements could be made regarding the more “general” relationship with income
inequality.
Finally, FracImmig represents the fraction of 1990–2000 cohort immigrants relative
to the total population in the local CBSA area. Alternatively, it represents the fraction
of this cohort of immigrants stratified by (a) race/ethnicity, and (b) country of origin.
Own-ethnic/country/cohort effects are explored as well—with a focus on groups with
larger numbers of immigrants during this period. It is worth reiterating that the com-
munity characteristics control for the percentage of various ethnic representations, so
that immigration is not instead picking up ethnic effects as well as this measure of di-
versity (See Holtug (2010) for a similar empirical distinction). It is also beneficial to use
wave of immigration (1990–2000 foreign born) in the current analysis to mitigate this
issue. In addition, concentration measures are used for both the inequality and immi-
gration measures due to recent evidence regarding their possible superiority and ease
of interpretation (Simpson 2006).
Following the work of Friedberg and Jaeger (2009), it was posited that there might be
a different relationship between immigration and volunteering in larger cities. In con-
trast to the main hypothesis of this analysis, it could be that natives selectively locate in
larger or smaller cities conditional on their personal proclivity for individualism. If this
is the case, then main analysis results may mask this selection by averaging over differ-
ent types of cities. For this reason, the analysis was restricted to CBSA’s/MSA’s with a
total population in the Census 2000 over 1,000,000 and a population density greater
than 0.001—robustness checks varied these boundaries with little or no change in ef-
fect. Since the amount and type of immigration can affect other average characteristics
of the local area, this reasoning was part of the impetus for also exploring regressions
without a subset of the specific city-characteristics, in addition to the baseline structure
mentioned above, for example, dropping the controls for total population, population
density, average age, employment rate, and education at the area level. In this way, it
was possible to determine how immigrants affect both local characteristics and directly
impact volunteering.
As a robustness check, the probit regression structure was varied to employ a linear-
ized regression structure. The reason for this empirical decision was that the 1989 CPS
supplements were constructed using a relatively small sample, so that noise from
employing a probit structure could obscure the true size of the coefficients. A linear-
ized regression, while not necessarily the optimal choice generally, would, in this sce-
nario, allow for less noisy results. The linear model was run using various instantiations
with, alternatively the coefficient on the average volunteering in the community (the se-
lection correction) being (a) unconstrained, (b) =1, (c) = 0.5. It is notable that (b) is
similar to a differencing analysis4.
In a final auxiliary analysis, the regressions from the main analysis were run
using the outcome of whether individuals voted, rather than whether they
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average voting in the community. Since the 1990 sample used for the voting selec-
tion correction did not suffer from the same sort of sample size issues as the
1989 supplements, the linearized regression was not employed for the voting re-
gressions. There was only one “type” of voting, however, it was disaggregated by
city size as well as employing or not employing various area level characteristics
in the regressions.
IV. Results and discussion
A. Descriptive statisticsFigFigures 1 and 2 display the immigration and volunteering rates in the United States.
Data for immigration come from the Census 2000 Summary Files, while data for
volunteering come from the Current Population Survey 2004–2008 September
Supplement files. Data in both figures are restricted to states used in the main
regression portion of the analysis. The figures generally show an inverse
relationship between the fraction foreign born in a state and volunteering rates in
the state with higher immigration in low volunteering states, and vice versa.
Perhaps the starkest example is New York, lying in the highest category of
immigration (19-27%) and the lowest category of volunteering (20-23%). States
with high immigration rates such as California, Illinois, and Texas have generally
mid-level or lower volunteering rates. Rarely is a state in the same category for
volunteering and immigration (Louisiana, Tennessee and Arkansas are notable ex-
ceptions). Overall, this initial introduction to the topic provides some preliminary
evidence for the idea that in the United States, high immigration is related to lower
levels of social cohesion and voluntary participation.
In Table 1, means are shown along with minimum and maximum values for each of
the variables used in the main (i.e. non-voting) regression analysis. Results from the
November Supplements are similar. The mean is further stratified by whetherure 1 Immigration in the United States: Fraction foreign born in the area.
Figure 2 Volunteering in the United States: Fraction Volunteering in the 2004-2008 Current
Population Surveys.
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means this was a larger restriction than in any of the individual regressions.
Individuals answering all relevant questions are labeled as part of the “controlled”
sample for this table. Variables are grouped into whether they refer to immigration
(coming from both the Census and the CPS data), individual characteristics (CPS),
inequality measures (Census), or volunteering variables (CPS). As seen from a com-
parison of the controlled and the uncontrolled samples, individuals answering all
questions were slightly different from individuals in the full sample—but not in un-
expected ways. Specifically, the controlled sample had older individuals (age 44 sub-
sample vs. age 37 full sample), fewer males (47.5% vs. 48.4% in the full sample) and
fewer racial minorities—both individually and in terms of location choice.
These differences are unsurprising given typical survey response patterns with, for
example, women and retirees more likely to answer surveys.
Income and education have similar means in both groups. Immigrant status shows
more first-generation individuals and fewer second and 2.5 generation individuals in
the sub-sample. This may be due to immigrants feeling an urge to “do their civic
duty” in answering CPS survey questions. In keeping with concerns on this issue, it
also implies that illegal immigrants might not constitute a large fraction of this data.
There was also a somewhat higher representation of individuals with children of all
ages in the data—consistent with expectations—as well as a slightly higher repre-
sentation of individuals doing volunteer work, both overall and in particular
categories.
In total, there were no surprising patterns in the survey responses, with the one
interesting result being higher rates of completion by first generation individuals.
Average volunteering also seems to have increased between 1989 and the 2004–2008
period. Although this may seem anomalous, given the predicted decreases over time,
this result is likely due to changes in survey coding and slight variations in the
Table 1 Summary statisticsa
Uncontrolled Controlled Min Max
First generation 13.0% 15.3% 0 1
Second generation 6.6% 4.1% 0 1
2.5 generation 4.6% 4.3% 0 1
2.5 Generation-mom foreign 2.2% 2.0% 0 1
2.5 Generation-dad foreign 2.5% 2.3% 0 1
Fraction immigrants (90-00 cohort) census 5.0% 4.9% 0 0.12
Age 36.991 44.041 1 85
Male 48.4% 47.5% 0 1
White 66.0% 69.3% 0 1
Black 12.5% 11.5% 0 1
Asian 5.4% 5.3% 0 1
American Indian 0.4% 0.4% 0 1
Hispanic 15.7% 13.4% 0 1
<$5000 2.5% 2.3% 0 1
$5000-$7499 1.8% 1.7% 0 1
$7500-$9999 1.8% 1.8% 0 1
$10000-$12499 2.6% 2.6% 0 1
$12500-$14999 2.6% 2.5% 0 1
$15000-$19999 4.1% 4.2% 0 1
$20000-$24999 5.3% 5.4% 0 1
$25000-$29999 5.6% 5.7% 0 1
$30000-$34999 6.1% 6.1% 0 1
$35000-$39999 5.5% 5.4% 0 1
$40000-$49999 8.9% 9.1% 0 1
$50000-$59999 9.0% 9.1% 0 1
$60000-$74999 11.3% 11.2% 0 1
>$75000 32.9% 33.0% 0 1
<1st grade 0.4% 0.3% 0 1
1-4th grade 0.8% 0.8% 0 1
5-6th grade 1.7% 1.6% 0 1
7-8th grade 2.3% 2.2% 0 1
9th grade 3.3% 3.2% 0 1
10th grade 3.9% 3.8% 0 1
11th grade 4.0% 3.9% 0 1
12th grade no diploma 1.5% 1.4% 0 1
H.S. Grad. 28.6% 27.4% 0 1
Some college 18.2% 18.4% 0 1
Associate degree vocational 3.9% 3.9% 0 1
Associate degree academic 3.8% 3.9% 0 1
B.S. degree 18.2% 19.0% 0 1
M.A. degree 6.6% 7.1% 0 1
Professional degree 1.5% 1.6% 0 1
Doctorate 1.2% 1.3% 0 1
Presence of kids age 0-2 5.9% 8.0% 0 1
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Table 1 Summary statisticsa (Continued)
Presence of kids age 3-5 6.1% 8.2% 0 1
Presence of kids age 6-13 12.1% 15.9% 0 1
Presence of kids age 14-17 7.6% 9.6% 0 1
Number in the household 3.336 2.998 1 16
Employed 62.5% 64.0% 0 1
Unemployed 3.2% 3.4% 0 1
Not in the labor force 34.3% 32.7% 0 1
Median Family Income (MSA) 5.E+04 5.E+04 26009 80036
Total Population (MSA) 4.E+06 4.E+06 82946 16373645
Average Age (MSA) 35.14 35.13 27.30 49.46
Employment Rate (MSA) 71.1% 71.4% 0.53 0.84
Graduate Degree (MSA) 8.6% 8.7% 0.03 0.18
B.S. Degree (MSA) 16.1% 16.3% 0.06 0.26
Associate Degree (MSA) 6.1% 6.1% 0.02 0.12
Some College (MSA) 23.7% 23.7% 0.15 0.38
High School Grad. (MSA) 26.7% 26.7% 0.18 0.49
Some High School (MSA) 12.4% 12.3% 0.04 0.20
Fraction below poverty 11.6% 11.4% 0.05 0.36
Fraction immigrants below poverty 5.3% 5.2% 0.00 0.25
Average to median income ratio 1.278 1.278 1.14 1.69
Average volunteering (1989)–group level 21.5% 21.8% 0 0.57
Average volunteering (2004-8)–indivl. level 28.4% 29.4% 0 1
Immigration 0.1% 0.1% 0 1
Religious 11.8% 12.5% 0 1
For kids 7.3% 7.8% 0 1
Social services 5.4% 5.7% 0 1
Civic 1.5% 1.6% 0 1
International 0.2% 0.2% 0 1
aMeans are displayed for the sample of all individuals (uncontrolled) as well as the sample who answered all questions
for variables used at any time in the volunteering regression analysis, (controlled). The minimum and maximum is
displayed for the uncontrolled sample.
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1989 average volunteering is only used as a control for average levels in
previous years and not in a panel structure in the present analysis.
B. Main regression analysis
All regressions were run at the individual level using probability weighting for
sample inclusion, binary indicators for year and region, and clustering of standard
errors on CBSA to allow for the most conservative estimates possible. Unless stated
otherwise, it can be assumed that the regressions were run with full controls for
individual and local area characteristics as described in the data and empirical
section. Coefficients from marginal probit regressions are displayed, along with the
absolute value of their associated t-statistics. Many of the regressions also display
two different panels of results using individuals in all cities, as well as using the sub-
sample of individuals in large and densely populated cities. The fraction of foreign born
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http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/52000 cohort of immigrants relative to the total population in the CBSA, or else the
number of 1990–2000 cohort immigrants by race/country of origin relative to the
total population in the city when more appropriate.
In Table 2, there are four regressions for each of the full sample of cities (Panel A),
as well as the large-city-only sample (Panel B) providing a total of eight regressions
in this table. The first two regressions in each panel have neither individual nor
area-level characteristics—other than year, region (and average income in Table 2)—
while the third and fourth regressions progressively add in the full set of individual
and area-level control characteristics. The exception being the immigrant location
selection correction (average volunteering in 1989) and measures of income
inequality, which are instead included in regressions used for Tables 3, 4, 5 and the
appendices.
Although it is standard to progressively add in controls, this structure is explicitly
emphasized here because of the possibility that the relationship between diversity
and social cohesion is changed when accounting for individual characteristics, or
because immigration actually causes some of the local average characteristics (see
Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, 2005). Later tables also rerun regressions with a
smaller number of local area controls with similar findings.e 2 Effect of foreign born on volunteeringa
idual controls - - x x
level controls - - - x
Panel A: All cities [1] [2] [3] [4]
Fraction foreign born −0.384 −0.292 −0.667 −1.315
[1.70] [1.31] [3.80]** [3.51]**
en–dad foreign (Binary) 0.001 0.028 0.03
[0.12] [3.56]** [3.54]**
n–mom foreign (Binary) 0.004 0.005 0.006
[0.46] [0.53] [0.64]
Second gen. (Binary) −0.077 −0.02 −0.015
[12.74]** [3.17]** [2.11]*
239059 239059 202518 202518
Panel B: Big cities [1] [2] [3] [4]
Fraction foreign born −0.552 −0.458 −0.642 −0.287
[2.12]* [1.79] [2.94]** [0.55]
en–dad foreign (Binary) 0.007 0.031 0.033
[0.68] [3.20]** [3.62]**
n–mom foreign (Binary) 0.011 0.009 0.009
[1.05] [0.77] [0.87]
Second gen. (Binary) −0.08 −0.026 −0.021
[15.33]** [3.58]** [3.07]**
Observations 133284 133284 111699 111699
icients are shown along with absolute values of t-statistics for the eight regressions of interest. All regressions use
bility weights for sample inclusion and clustering on the highest relevant level for the most conservative standard
possible in the analysis. All regressions further include controls for year and region. Individual characteristics added
e analysis in column 3 include age, age2, sex, education, family income, race, the presence of children, number of
uals in the household and employment status. Area characteristics added into the analysis in column 4 include
opulation, population density, average age, employment rate, fraction of various race groups, education and
n family income. * and ** show statistical significance at the 5% and the 1% level respectively.
Table 3 Effect of fraction foreign born on volunteeringa
Panel A: All cities Inequality measure: Inequality measure: Inequality measure:
Fraction foreign born below poverty Mean to median income Fraction below poverty
Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Fraction foreign born −1.213 −1.189 −1.189 −1.234 −1.193 −1.969 −1.34 −1.294 −1.668
[3.27]** [3.21]** [3.50]** [3.38]** [3.29]** [5.13]** [3.62]** [3.45]** [3.77]**
Second gen. (Binary) −0.014 −0.013 −0.013
[1.89] [1.78] [1.77]
2.5 Gen–mom foreign (Binary) 0.007 0.008 0.008
[0.80] [0.87] [0.85]
2.5 Gen–dad foreign (Binary) 0.032 0.032 0.032
[3.79]** [3.81]** [3.80]**
Average volunteering 1989 0.193 0.186 0.273 0.197 0.187 0.284 0.212 0.2 0.264
[3.00]** [2.79]** [3.19]** [3.14]** [2.89]** [3.62]** [3.23]** [2.94]** [3.28]**
Inequality measure −0.032 −0.021 0 0.004 −0.021 0.815 −0.53 −0.449 −0.423
[0.60] [0.39] [0.00] [0.03] [0.13] [3.10]** [1.30] [1.06] [0.68]
Observations 181426 163394 8725 182653 164529 8764 182653 164529 8764
Panel B: Large cities Inequality measure: Inequality measure: Inequality measure:
Fraction foreign born below poverty Mean to median income Fraction below poverty
Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Fraction foreign born −0.213 −0.156 −1.438 −0.308 −0.246 −1.928 −0.297 −0.222 −1.223
[0.46] [0.34] [2.06]* [0.67] [0.56] [2.66]** [0.56] [0.45] [1.13]




















Table 3 Effect of fraction foreign born on volunteeringa (Continued)
2.5 Gen–mom foreign (Binary) 0.009 0.009 0.009
[0.78] [0.78] [0.78]
2.5 Gen–dad foreign (Binary) 0.032 0.032 0.032
[3.25]** [3.22]** [3.23]**
Average volunteering 1989 0.098 0.083 0.342 0.112 0.095 0.381 0.111 0.093 0.316
[0.92] [0.73] [2.19]* [1.07] [0.87] [2.79]** [1.00] [0.79] [2.25]*
Inequality measure −0.079 −0.065 0.077 −0.247 −0.258 1.584 0.038 0.056 0.491
[1.34] [1.08] [0.57] [0.98] [1.02] [3.98]** [0.04] [0.06] [0.19]
Observations 103937 91713 6353 103937 91713 6353 103937 91713 6353
(Full Controls, Various Inequality Measures).
aCoefficients are shown along with absolute values of t-statistics for the eighteen regressions of interest. All regressions use probability weights for sample inclusion and clustering on the highest relevant level for the
most conservative standard errors possible in the analysis. All regressions further include controls for year and region as well as the individual and area characteristics enumerated in Table 2. Regressions are stratified
by inequality measure employed, city size status, as well as whether the natives in the sample of interest are the full group, the 3rd-plus or the second generation of natives. * and ** show statistical significance at the



















Table 4 Effect of fraction foreign born by race on volunteeringa
Panel A: All cities Inequality measure: Inequality measure: Inequality measure:
Frac foreign born below pov. Mean to median incom Fraction below poverty
Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen Full sample 3+ gen nd gen Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Fraction foreign born Asian 8.146 8.685 3.077 8.118 8.427 3.801 8.374 8.655 4.565
[3.81]** [3.90]** [0.80] [4.11]** [4.05]** [1.07] [4.22]** [4.12]** [1.43]
Fraction foreign born hisp. −1.461 −1.531 −0.492 −1.317 −1.351 −1.251 −1.646 −1.672 −0.735
[2.84]** [2.98]** [0.63] [2.64]** [2.72]** [1.68] [3.17]** [3.20]** [1.00]
Fraction foreign born white −4.581 −4.349 −7.598 −4.778 −4.57 −6.788 −4.651 −4.435 −7.388
[4.09]** [3.98]** [5.66]** [4.57]** [4.48]** [4.64]** [4.39]** [4.29]** [5.57]**
Second gen. (0/1) −0.014 −0.014 −0.014
[2.03]* [2.04]* [2.03]*
2.5 Gen-mom foreign (0/1) 0.008 0.009 0.009
[0.93] [1.05] [1.03]
2.5 Gen–dad foreign (0/1) 0.032 0.032 0.032
[3.96]** [4.15]** [4.12]**
Average volunteering 1989 0.186 0.177 0.274 0.191 0.181 0.264 0.209 0.199 0.255
[3.03]** [2.79]** [3.26]** [3.22]** [2.94]** [3.40]** [3.36]** [3.06]** [3.18]**
Inequality measure −0.049 −0.043 0.013 −0.139 −0.149 0.447 −0.58 −0.562 0.11
[0.95] [0.80] [0.11] [0.93] [0.96] [1.46] [1.43] [1.31] [0.19]




















Table 4 Effect of fraction foreign born by race on volunteeringa (Continued)
Panel B: Large cities Inequality measure: Inequality measure: Inequality measure:
Frac foreign born below pov. Mean to median income Fraction below poverty
Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Fraction foreign born Asian 12.746 13.788 5.924 12.394 13.441 3.954 12.335 13.415 6.628
[4.53]** [4.86]** [1.04] [4.55]** [4.97]** [0.59] [3.92]** [4.42]** [1.12]
Fraction foreign born hisp. 0.25 0.11 0.274 0.07 −0.078 −0.519 0.249 0.114 0.839
[0.62] [0.25] [0.32] [0.16] [0.17] [0.49] [0.53] [0.23] [0.88]
Fraction foreign born white −7.076 −6.896 −11.245 −7.272 −7.065 −8.727 −6.743 −6.595 −10.94
[5.38]** [4.97]** [4.32]** [5.32]** [5.09]** [2.92]** [4.98]** [4.83]** [3.82]**
Second gen. (0/1) −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
[3.45]** [3.35]** [3.54]**
2.5 Gen-mom foreign (0/1) 0.009 0.009 0.009
[1.00] [0.98] [1.01]
2.5 Gen–dad foreign (0/1) 0.033 0.032 0.033
[4.30]** [4.19]** [4.35]**
Average volunteering 1989 0.126 0.111 0.398 0.149 0.132 0.411 0.138 0.121 0.365
1.41] [1.14] [2.86]** [1.71] [1.40] [3.09]** [1.45] [1.18] [2.74]**
Inequality measure −0.13 −0.115 0.037 −0.387 −0.373 1.055 0.524 0.498 1.481
[2.14]* [1.94] [0.40] [1.58] [1.55] [2.28]* [0.59] [0.54] [0.71]
Observations 103937 91713 6353 103937 91713 6353 103937 91713 6353
aCoefficients are shown along with absolute values of t-statistics for the eighteen regressions of interest. All regressions use probability weights for sample inclusion and clustering on the highest relevant level for the
most conservative standard errors possible in the analysis. All regressions further include controls for year and region as well as the individual and area characteristics enumerated in Table 2. Regressions are stratified



















Table 5 Effect of fraction foreign born of your racial group on volunteeringa
Panel A: All cities
White Asian Hispanic
Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Fraction foreign born–your ethnicity −4.136 −4.029 −8.946 −9.073 −15.267 3.295 0.245 0.509 −0.46
[3.56]** [3.43]** [4.33]** [1.56] [0.82] [0.38] [0.47] [0.92] [0.38]
Second gen. (Binary) −0.018 −0.025 −0.018
[1.61] [0.81] [2.71]**
2.5 Gen–mom foreign (Binary) 0.003 0.005 0.019
[0.25] [0.10] [1.50]
2.5 Gen–dad foreign (Binary) 0.02 −0.054 0.043
[1.97]* [0.78] [4.82]**
Average volunteering 1989 0.21 0.202 0.268 0.677 0.665 1.279 0.289 0.431 0.055
[2.79]** [2.63]** [1.41] [2.87]** [1.56] [4.56]** [3.79]** [4.81]** [0.40]
Inequality measure −0.023 −0.01 −0.011 0.499 2.019 0.32 0.155 0.293 0.357
[0.35] [0.15] [0.08] [1.08] [1.80] [0.73] [1.08] [1.84] [1.20]
Observations 139512 129593 3516 3008 1042 1481 13368 8099 3285
Panel B: Large cities
White Asian Hispanic
Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen Full sample 3+ gen 2nd gen
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Fraction foreign born–your ethnicity −4.475 −4.402 −4.114 −3.487 −33.827 13.182 2.798 4.585 1.011
[2.21]* [2.16]* [1.24] [0.16] [0.40] [0.53] [4.73]** [6.09]** [0.67]




















Table 5 Effect of fraction foreign born of your racial group on volunteeringa (Continued)
2.5 Gen–mom foreign (Binary) 0.003 −0.001 0.017
[0.19] [0.01] [0.99]
2.5 Gen–dad foreign (Binary) 0.021 −0.085 0.045
[1.74] [0.85] [3.96]**
Average volunteering 1989 0.065 0.058 −0.039 0.532 −0.88 1.748 0.207 0.336 0.116
[0.56] [0.48] [0.15] [1.19] [1.27] [4.80]** [1.84] [2.51]* [0.49]
Inequality measure −0.039 −0.014 −0.219 0.502 4.803 0.303 −0.095 −0.23 1.391
[0.49] [0.17] [1.45] [0.80] [0.76] [0.52] [0.69] [1.32] [4.08]**
Observations 80021 73165 2653 1485 304 993 8816 5144 2420
Inequality Measure: Fraction Foreign Born Below Poverty.
aCoefficients are shown along with absolute values of t-statistics for the fifty-four regressions of interest (18 in 3 subsections of this table). All regressions use probability weights for sample inclusion and clustering on
the highest relevant level for the most conservative standard errors possible in the analysis. All regressions further include controls for year and region as well as the individual and area characteristics enumerated in
Table 2. Regressions are stratified by inequality measure employed as well as whether the natives in the sample of interest are the full group, the 3rd-plus or the second generation of natives. Further stratification is
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http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/5Both Panels in Table 2 display a negative relationship between the fraction of
foreign born individuals from the 1990–2000 cohort and the likelihood that natives
in the sample will volunteer. It is also true that the regressions are not invariant to
the choice of individual and area-level controls. Negative impacts of immigration
are especially pronounced for the full sample of cities, but less so for the sample of
larger cities. This is the first indication that big cities may be different than the full
sample in feeling a smaller impact of diversity on individual volunteering, which is
consistent with the explanation that the effect seen can be partially attributed to the
preferences of residents of cities, as opposed to the negative impact of immigration
on native volunteering rates. Within the sample of affected natives, second gener-
ation individuals are the least likely to volunteer. This result is maintained with
some frequency throughout the analysis. It is also true that, for some specifications,
2.5 generation individuals with a foreign father are the most likely of all natives to
volunteer. This is an interesting result, and may indicate that a foreign father makes
individuals more tied to communities, while a native mother makes them more able
to integrate into the current society in order to volunteer.
Table 3 again splits the regressions into those relating to the full sample (Panel A) and
the large city sample (Panel B), and employs all relevant control characteristics,
including the selection correction and income inequality measures (as well as year and
region dummies)5. Further stratification of regressions is based on which inequality
measure is used. Results are shown for the “full” sample of natives (2nd, 2.5 and third-
plus generation) in columns 1, 4, and 7, as well as for the third-plus generation in col-
umns 2, 5, and 8, and for the second generation in columns 3, 6 and 9.
Turning first to Panel A, I find that, regardless of the inequality measure used,
immigrants have a negative impact on the likelihood of natives volunteering. It is
also true that the average volunteering in 1989 is positively related to current levels
of volunteering. Once again, foreign born fathers and native mothers have children
who volunteer more, while the negative impact of the second generation is not
quite statistically significant at the 10%, but only at the 5% level. These results look
very similar to those in Table 2 and appear to show a strong effect of immigration.
Interestingly, there is little impact of any of the inequality measures. The robustness
check using a smaller set of area characteristics still showed a similar pattern of
results with a smaller (but still significant at the 5% level) effect of immigration and
a larger effect of some measures of inequality.
In large cities examined in Panel B, in keeping with results in Table 2, the pattern of
effects is not as clear. Although the second generation is negatively impacted by the
volunteering of immigrants, there is no measurably significant impact on the third-plus
generation, which is arguably more important for the present analysis. This provides fur-
ther evidence that large cities are not being negatively impacted by the effect of immi-
gration on the provision of public goods, and may mitigate the relative importance of
immigrants in decreasing social cohesion more generally. It is also notable that previous
volunteering and inequality did not seem to matter much in these large cities, while in
the larger sample of cities, average 1989 volunteering still had a measurable impact.
The next possibility I explored was that the effect of immigration varied by type of
immigrant, and furthermore, that immigrants were impacting others of their own
ethnicity more strongly than natives in other ethnic groups. Tables 4 and 5 examine
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http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/5the effects of race and ethnicity for Asian, Hispanic and white immigrants—with
Black immigrants excluded due to their small numbers in this cohort. Table 4 first
examines the impact of immigration by race on all types of native individuals, while
Table 5 examines the impact of immigration of individuals of one’s own-race (i.e.
Asian immigrants on Asian natives)6. Specifically, Table 5 uses three entirely differ-
ent samples of natives (i.e. those of White, Asian or Hispanic race) and examines
specifically the effect of immigration of individuals of the same ethnicity as the na-
tives in each of the three race/ethnic groups of interest. Both tables use the panel
structure for city size breakout, as well as separately looking at different measures
of inequality and generation of natives.
In Table 4, both panels show a relationship with volunteering which is positive for
Asian immigration and negative for white immigration. This result is generally
consistent—with the positive relationship with Asian immigration reduced in
significance below traditional levels (5% or 10%) for the second generation of
natives. While Hispanic immigration has a negative relationship for the full sample
of cities, this effect is not significant at statistical levels in the group of larger cities.
This difference in the Hispanic relationship in particular could explain the varying
effect of immigration on native volunteering in large versus small cities.
Next, the hypothesis that immigration by race has an effect because individuals
interact to a greater extent with others of their own race was explored. The layout
of Table 5 has the same panel structure as Table 4, with the additional breakout of
racial group of interest. The inequality measure here is mean to median income,
with other inequality results looking extremely similar and included in Additional
file 1: Table S5 for reference. Looking first at white individuals, it is clear that white
immigrants have a negative relationship with the volunteering of white natives, thus
same-ethnic relationships are quite strong. This is true for all inequality measures
and both samples—with some differences in coefficients and significance but
the same general pattern of results. For Asian immigrants, relationships are still
positive, although significance decreases below the 5% level in most cases, so it is
difficult to draw consistent conclusions. It would appear, however, that Asian immi-
gration is not having a detrimental impact on Asian natives.
There is very little significance in the relationship between Hispanic immigrants
and Hispanic native volunteering in the full sample of cities. However, the impact of
Hispanic immigrants on Hispanic native volunteering is actually positive in large
cities. This could explain why there was no negative impact of Hispanic immigrants
in large cities in Table 3. Namely, any negative impact is counterbalanced by the
positive same-ethnic effects.
In summary, my results so far lend support to the idea that immigration negatively
affects volunteering rates in the full sample of cities, with the caveat that these
results are generally not maintained in the large—and densely populated—cities. My
results may be explained by the positive interactions that Hispanic immigrants
enjoy with Hispanic natives in large cities, perhaps because of enclaves, making the
negative impact at the larger city-group level disappear. Considering that the 1990–
2000 cohort was largely composed of Hispanic immigrants, this difference may ex-
plain the anomalous nature of United States social cohesion erosion.
The results may also be influenced by native selection on individualism.
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at an own-ethnic level), while Asian immigrants appear to have a positive effect on volun-
teering rates. One possibility for the existence of this posited large negative impact of white
immigrants on white individuals is the concept of social threat.
Specifically, social threat theory maintains that natives are happy to help immigrants until
the point that they threaten their own identity. An immigrant who looks similar to a
native poses a larger "threat" than one who looks dissimilar and may have a harder time
competing. In the “white” community, this concept of protecting one’s identity from the
success of immigrants of one’s own type may, in fact, be a more relevant concern than in
minority populations.
C. Auxiliary analyses
Country of Origin–Additional file 1: Table S1 explores the possibility that country of
origin, rather than ethnicity, is the responsible agent. In line with previous results, this
table appears to show a positive effect of immigrants from Asia on volunteering in the full
sample of cities. The full sample of cities also appears to show negative effects of
Caribbean, European and “possibly”Mexican immigrants. The results for Europeans would
then be in accordance with the possibility derived from Tables 4 and 5 that white
immigrants have a negative impact on volunteering.
In large cities, however, the effects are less consistently significant—this is in line with
weaker effects of immigration in large cities as discussed in previous tables. Although
being born in Africa or South America may have a “positive impact”, with the South
America results perhaps similar to the positive effect of Hispanics in large cities, these
results are not consistently significant. There are also inconsistent negative effects of
being from Oceania, South America and Mexico. Overall, the effects for the large city
regressions are less significant, and do not appear to show as much of an effect of
immigration as those for the full sample. This is in line with expectations given the
results in earlier tables in this analysis.
Type of volunteering–I next explored differences in the effects of immigration on various
types of volunteering, with the particular categories of interest being religious, civic, social
services, immigrant-focused, international, and volunteering for a child-focused
organization. This is important since one might argue that volunteering for a children’s
organization, as an example, is at least a partially self-interested act by a parent and not ne-
cessarily representative of more general forms of volunteering. See Neymotin (2013) for a
discussion of the link between parental involvement in schooling and child behavioral out-
comes. Results are generally similar for all of these different types. This point is very inter-
esting since it means that, at least in this fashion, immigration is affecting education
through involvement in exactly the same way as it affects other forms of social cohesion,
making it possible to further generalize results.
In Additional file 1: Table S2, regressions are shown for six different types of
volunteering (kids, religious, civic, social services, international and immigrant-
focused), and regressions were run for the full set of natives, as well as the subset of
the third-plus generation. Results were also run for both an overall measure of im-
migration as well as a measure using the fraction from different racial groups.
All regressions used the ratio of average to median income as the relevant
measure of inequality. Regressions using other inequality measures provided
similar results.
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immigration. While there may be differences in magnitude or significance, however,
there does not seem to be any change in sign for these coefficients. For instance,
white immigrants do appear to have a negative impact on volunteering, although
this effect is clearly insignificant when it comes to volunteering for an immigrant
group. Similarly, Asian immigrants have a positive impact, although the strength of
the effect is strongest for the religious and the international regressions. Being born
Hispanic, interestingly, has a negative impact, but it is only significant at
conventional levels for religious and civic volunteering. Taken as a larger measure,
volunteering for immigrant groups does not seem to be too closely related to
immigrant representation. The reasoning here might be that immigrants normally
have a negative impact on immigration, but for this particular type of immigration
it should be positive, leading to a zero net effect. Overall, these results mirror those
from the main analysis for the full sample of cities.
Linear probability model–The next specification employed was the linear probability
model for an individual’s decision to volunteer. The coefficient on the average
1989 volunteering in the community was, alternatively, (a) unrestricted, (b) = 1, and
(c) = 0.5. Additional file 1: Table S3 examines the results of using these three
additional specifications, and is similar in structure to Table 3. However, only the full
sample of cities is employed in this table, with (undisplayed) results from stratifying
on city size or using a smaller set of city characteristics providing similar results for
the purposes of this robustness check.
Additional file 1: Table S3 shows that, for all specifications of interest, the probit
model provides similar results to those coming from the linearized regression
models. The “differenced” regression, i.e. (b) =1, does have slightly lower levels of
significance on the effect of the fraction foreign born. Even so, the effect on the 3+
generation is still always significant at the 10%, if not always at the 5% level.
It is also true that using the linearized regression shows stronger impacts of the
inequality measures in several cases, indicating that there may indeed have been
some noise arising from using the smaller 1989 CPS supplement. Overall, the
linearized regressions provide further support in keeping with the negative
relationship between the fraction foreign born in the city and social cohesion. This
effect appears relatively consistent throughout the various instantiations employed.
Linearized regressions (results not shown) were also run using a structure similar to
Table 4 (by race) and Table 5 (own-race) with a similar pattern of effects to those in
Additional file 1: Table S3. Namely, while results in the linearized regressions
generally mirrored those in the probit regressions, the “difference” regression had
the weakest effects—although, with the exception of white own-race effects, they
were still significant at the 10% level if they had been significant at the 5% or the
1% in the probit structure. Overall, results were seen to verify patterns in the main
portion of the analysis.
Voting–The final auxiliary analysis employed whether an individual voted, rather
than volunteered, as the measure of social cohesion. Additional file 1: Table S4
displays the results from this final specification and uses a table layout equivalent to
that used in Table 3. Voting is negatively related to the fraction of immigrants in an
area, and, in contrast to results for volunteering, this effect does not diminish when
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magnified in size in larger cities. Regressions employing a race and own-race struc-
ture found similar results, with larger cities showing the same or larger impacts of
immigration on the likelihood of an individual voting. In contrast to volunteering,
own-race differences with Hispanic enclaves do not appear to tell the story for vot-
ing. This is expected, since larger city effects do not diminish relative to the entire
sample. Results are available upon request.
These preliminary results on voting verify its negative relationship with immigrant
representation. However, these results do not implicate city size in the same way as
in the regressions with volunteering as the measure of social cohesion. The reason
could be due to the interactive nature of volunteering, in contrast to voting, which
occurs as a solitary act, so that city size will function differently.V. Conclusions
Since Putnam’s 2007 work showing that immigration decreased social cohesion in
towns in Italy, scholars have been trying to replicate and verify results for the United
States, as well as for Europe, with limited success. Difficulty in finding appropriate data,
as well as methods to control for selection and income inequality have hampered their
efforts at answering this question.
My paper is innovative in presenting one plausible explanation for why Europe and
the United States have such different effects of immigration on social cohesion as mea-
sured by the traditional “club associations/volunteering,” while attempting to address
the previously mentioned concerns.
Although some prior works did stratify results by city size, they found little verifiable em-
pirical results (Alesina et al. 1999). Examining the outcome of volunteering, it appears that
the problem has been a decrease in social cohesion in the smaller (or rather, “less large”) cit-
ies in the United States with a particular problem with Hispanic immigrants—as compared
to larger cities. Thus, large city data do appear similar to European results in showing a lack
of a relationship between immigration and volunteering after accounting for income in-
equality. It is the smaller U.S. cities, admittedly dissimilar from Europe in culture and con-
tact with other groups, which look anomalous in this immigration-social cohesion
relationship, since immigration still does have an effect after controlling for inequality mea-
sures. This being said, it is not possible to dismiss the possibility mentioned earlier that na-
tives selectively move to larger or smaller cities conditional on their individuality. This
hypothesis is supported by the large-city size results.
Although there has been some preliminary work on the effects of immigration on social
cohesion in homogeneous societies (Yamamura 2008), this is not an area that has been pa-
rticularly well-explored or understood. For this reason, the United States still tends to look
anomalous and my analysis is unique in exploring this genre of effects at all.
In the case of voting, however, it is true that while immigration is negatively related
to social cohesion, preliminary analyses here indicate that the pathway by which im-
migrants are assimilated, and the type of social cohesion built may look somewhat dis-
similar relative to city size relationships for volunteering. For this reason, employing
two different measures of social cohesion is also useful in beginning to understand the
exact method in which immigrants are assimilated into society.
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gain benefits to society, and if it is truly smaller cities that have difficulty assimilating
immigrants, then the focus needs to be on assimilating the particular groups of
Hispanic immigrants in smaller cities and, to a lesser extent because they are a smaller
section of the population, white immigrants. This would fly in the face of new
programs, which tend to target larger cities. It is also true that a positive effect of Asian
immigration can be taken from these results, so that this particular subgroup would
not be seen as inherently detrimental to the well-being and functioning of native social
cohesion in the United States.
One possible direction for future research is to identify the existence of a tipping
point in city size wherein the relationship between immigration and volunteering mea-
sures of social cohesion begins to change from smaller cities, that experience a decrease
in social cohesion with increasing Hispanic immigration, to larger cities where this no
longer seems to be an issue, and Hispanic immigrants may even increase social cohe-
sion with, in particular, their fellow Hispanics. This tipping point hypothesis is in keep-
ing with a suggestion by Robert Putnam in his 2007 work, which he could not quite
find evidence for in that particular data. On a similar note, it would be useful to extend
the present voting results to employ smaller levels of aggregation, such as census local
areas or tract data on voting and communities, to determine the effect of smaller or lar-
ger areas in this context.
It should also be noted that there are alternative explanations for these results. One
possibility is that other individual characteristics in the data are biasing the effect of im-
migration. This was a choice of specification made so that the analysis was not ham-
pered by omitted variables bias from the deletion of key individual characteristics from
the analysis. Slight variations in the inclusion of individual factors did not, however,
change the essential nature of the results.
Chief among the more plausible explanations are that, rather than an inability of
small cities to assimilate immigrants in the volunteering data, there is either (a) select-
ive response on Hispanic ethnicity conditional on city size and, therefore, comfort in
being identified as a member of this group, or (b) a different type of Hispanic immigra-
tion proceeding into larger versus smaller cities, with the possibility that legal versus il-
legal immigrants show up differently by city size in this data, and (c) the previously
mentioned possibility that natives sort on city size conditional on individualism.
The first explanation will, undoubtedly, be a factor which is quite difficult to dis-
count. As for the second effect, it has been addressed to some extent by controlling for
selection on observable average historic volunteering levels. However, it is possible that
facets of Hispanic immigration which differ between the locations still remain intact,
and this is indeed a factor at play. It is also telling that, for voting, the city size and
Hispanic element does not seem to come into play in the same respect. This points to a
clear need to consider the type of social cohesion carefully when examining the reasons
for the accrual of social cohesion within communities. Finally, the third point has been
extensively discussed as a plausible alternative, noting of course that natives generally
in the literature do not sort between areas larger than the county level (and often the
literature also shows lack of sorting between different MSA’s).
It is also true that the results from various types of volunteer organizations can pro-
vide further guidance on where exactly social cohesion may be breaking down. The
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but also appeared for civic, international and perhaps social services organizations. This
implies that individuals are not simply following patterns driven by clergy and other re-
ligious leaders, nor are they volunteering to help their own children based on these im-
migration patterns. The results gathered for these various different types of
volunteering organizations indicate that the patterns for relationships documented are
more generally applicable irrespective of the types of volunteering involved.
Taken together, the present analysis has made large inroads in an effort to clear up a
fledgling debate in the literature and helps contribute to our understanding of exactly
how social cohesion may be affected by an influx of immigrants to the United States,
and thereby possibly affect other important aspects of society.
In the case of volunteering, it appears to be occurring through the smaller cities for
the most part, while larger cities have results more similar to those in Europe. In these
small cities, it also appears to be white and Hispanic immigrants who are of interest in
the relationship, with an inability of smaller communities to easily assimilate Hispanic
immigrants perhaps being the reason for this documented relationship.Endnotes
1Hours of volunteering were available but not employed due to (a) evidence that,
without a two-part hurdle structure—unavailable in this data—hours will be incorrectly
measured (Hamermesh and Trejo 2013), (b) the difficulty in accurately measuring
hours of volunteering due to recall bias in individuals remembering exact hours volun-
teered —rather than a simple binary indicator for participation—from the previous year,
(c) evidence that the extensive rather than the intensive margin is the relationship of
interest here, also in keeping with evidence in Letki (2008) that the social trust does
not relate to the intensive margin of volunteering behaviors.
2It is also true that natives may sort by area even at these higher levels of aggregation, and
the effect of this sorting is later discussed in moderating the strength of results in this analysis.
3While Hispanic race was not explicitly included in the measures of the percentage
representation by race in the Census data used, there is an unmistakably strong correl-
ation between Hispanic and “other race.” The current analysis, while including a binary
for Hispanic at the individual level, does not separately control for the percentage
“other race.” Results were repeated including a control for the percentage other-race
and found only very small differences in magnitude and almost never moved any co-
efficients of interest from statistically significant at the 5% or 1% level to lower levels of
insignificance.
4Notice that the nature of the regression structure, in particular probability weighting
for sample inclusion, precluded an analysis with fixed effects for location choice in
this case.
5Prior to this paper version, regressions were stratified by region with the notable re-
sult that effects were generally concentrated in the Western region of the United States.
Current regressions focus on the more aggregated version of the paper to retain the
largest dataset possible.
6Alternatively, regressions using all breakdowns of immigration by ethnicity on affec-
ting natives of each separate race were run, however, there was insufficient data size to
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sults were quite strong for white natives, with Hispanic natives negatively affected by
white immigrants only in the larger cities. Results for Asians generally employed very
small datasets-less than 1000 in many cases-so that they had even less predictive power
than the Hispanic-native regressions.
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